51 ideas
10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
7906 | When the Buddha reached the highest level of insight, he could detect no self in the world [Ashvaghosha] |
390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
7904 | The first stage of trance is calm amidst applied and discursive thinking [Ashvaghosha] |
7905 | The Buddha sought ultimate reality and the final goal of existence in his meditations [Ashvaghosha] |